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TAX CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE AND LEGAL
SEPARATION
Duncan A. Peete*
William E. Coffee**
I. INTRODUCTION
Legal separation and divorce frequently involve the payment
of alimony, child support, and division of property. Such payments
and property transfers raise significant tax considerations for the
general practitioners who assist in separation or divorce. The In-
ternal Revenue Code (the Code) contains specific provisions that
govern the former spouses' tax consequences during separation and
divorce.1 A familiarity with these provisions is necessary to mini-
mize the tax detriment and to maximize the tax benefit to both
spouses.
This Article specifically addresses the tax consequences of ali-
mony payments, child support payments, and property transfers
incident to separation or divorce. Moreover, this Article analyzes
the effect that separation or divorce has on former spouses' filing
status and dependency exemptions. Finally, this Article explains
the rules that govern the deductibility of legal expenses that arise
during separation or divorce.
II. ALIMONY PAYMENTS
A divorce decree or separation agreement2 may require a tax-
payer to provide for the financial support of the former spouse.
This support usually takes the form of alimony or separate mainte-
nance payments. The recipient of alimony or separate maintenance
* Associate, Moulton, Bellingham, Longo & Mather, Billings, Montana. B.A., Duke
University, 1988; J.D., University of Montana, 1991; L.L.M. in Taxation, University of Flor-
ida, 1992.
** Associate, Crowley, Haughey, Hanson, Toole & Dietrich, Billings, Montana. B.S.,
Montana State University, 1986; J.D., University of Montana, 1992.
1. The Code uses the terms "divorce," "alimony," and "separation." Applying the no-
fault concept, Montana law refers to "divorce" as a "dissolution of marriage," MoNT. CODE
ANN. § 40-4-104 (1993), and "alimony" as "maintenance," MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-203
(1993). For consistency, the authors have chosen to use the terms "divorce" and "alimony."
Additionally, the authors use the terms "separation" and "legal separation"
interchangeably.
2. The Code defines "divorce or separation instrument" as: "(A) a decree of divorce or
separate maintenance or a written instrument incident to such a decree, (B) a written sepa-
ration agreement, or (C) a decree ... requiring a spouse to make payments for the support
or maintenance of the other spouse." I.R.C. § 71(b)(2) (1988).
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(payee spouse) must include such payments in gross income.' The
individual making the payments, the payor spouse, can deduct the
payments made during the taxable year when calculating taxable
income." This assignment of income from the payor spouse to the
payee spouse may produce tax savings if the payor spouse is in a
higher income tax bracket than the payee spouse.5 Congress, how-
ever, has prescribed a number of requirements that former spouses
must satisfy in order for these payments to qualify as alimony for
federal income tax purposes.6
A. Payments Must Be in the Form of Cash
To qualify as alimony, the Code requires that the payments be
in the form of cash. Cash payments include checks and money
orders payable on demand.' Cash payments, however, do not in-
clude: (1) a transfer of services, (2) a transfer of property, (3) the
execution of a debt instrument by the payor spouse, or (4) the use
of property belonging to the payor spouse.9
B. Payments Must Be Made to or on Behalf of Payee Spouse
The payor spouse usually makes alimony payments directly to
the payee spouse. Sometimes, however, the payor spouse provides
payments to a third party on behalf of the payee spouse. 1° A cash
3. I.R.C. § 71(a) (1988). The payee spouse reports the alimony payments on Form
1040.
4. I.R.C. § 215(a) (1988). Alimony payments constitute an above-the-line deduction
for purposes of calculating the taxpayer's adjusted gross income. I.R.C. § 62(a)(10) (1988).
The payor spouse claims the alimony payments as a deduction on Form 1040 for the tax
year in which the payments are made. The payor spouse also must include the payee
spouse's social security number on Form 1040. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.215-IT, Q & A-1
(1984). The payee spouse must furnish this number to the payor spouse. Temp. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.215-IT, Q & A-1 (1984). If either of the former spouses fails to comply with the above
rules, he or she is subject to a $50 penalty. I.R.C. §§ 6723 (1994). This penalty will not
apply if the payee or payor spouse's failure to comply was due to reasonable cause rather
than willful neglect. I.R.C. § 6724(a) (1988). With respect to the payor spouse, reasonable
cause exists if the payor spouse solicits the payee spouse's social security number, but the
payee spouse fails to furnish it by the time the payor spouse files an income tax return.
Treas. Reg. § 301.6724-1(e)(1) (1993).
5. For example, if the payor spouse is in the 28% tax bracket and the payee spouse is
in the 15% tax bracket, alimony payments of $10,000 during the year will result in an over-
all tax savings of $1,300 at the 1993 income rates. The payor spouse receives $2,800 in tax
savings by claiming a $10,000 deduction, and the payee spouse experiences an increased tax
liability of $1,500 by including $10,000 in gross income.
6. See I.R.C. § 71(b) (1988).
7. I.R.C. § 71(b)(1) (1988).
8. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1T(b), Q & A-5 (1984).
9. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1T(b), Q & A-5.
10. See I.R.C. § 71(b)(1)(A) (1988). For example, pursuant to a divorce decree or sep-
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payment to a third party qualifies as alimony as long as the payor
spouse makes the payment pursuant to a divorce or separation in-
strument. 1 Thus, payment of the payee spouse's expenses,
whether living or other expenses, qualifies as alimony if made pur-
suant to the terms of a divorce or separation instrument. Addition-
ally, a payor spouse's payment of premiums on a life insurance pol-
icy that covers the payor spouse's life also qualifies as alimony "to
the extent that the payee spouse is the owner of the policy." 2
However, cash payments, including mortgage payments, real estate
taxes, and insurance premiums, which maintain property that the
payor spouse owns and the payee spouse uses, do not constitute
alimony even if made pursuant to a divorce or separation
instrument. 3
Even if the divorce or separation instrument does not provide
for cash payments to a third party, such payments may qualify as
alimony if the payor spouse makes these payments pursuant to the
written request, consent, or ratification of the payee spouse." The
payee spouse's written request, consent, or ratification must state
that the former spouses intend these third-party payments to be
treated as alimony for tax purposes. 5 Furthermore, the payor
spouse must receive the written request, consent, or ratification
before filing a tax return for the year of payment.'6
C. Payments Cannot Be Designated as Excludible and
Nondeductible
If the divorce or separation instrument designates the pay-
ments as excludible from the payor spouse's gross income and non-
deductible by the payor spouse, the payments do not qualify as
alimony.'7 Consequently, the former spouses may elect to treat
qualifying alimony payments as non-alimony for tax purposes by
including such a provision in a divorce or separation instrument.'8
aration agreement, the payor spouse may be ordered to pay such expenses as the payee
spouse's rent, taxes, or tuition.
11. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-iT(b), Q & A-6 (1984). See supra note 2.
12. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1T(b), Q & A-6.
13. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1T(b), Q & A-6.
14. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1T(b), Q & A-7 (1984).
15. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1T(b), Q & A-7.
16. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1T(b), Q & A-7. Payments that a payor spouse makes
pursuant to a payee spouse's written request, consent, or ratification must replace amounts
directly payable to the payee spouse under a divorce or separation instrument. Otherwise,
the payments will constitute voluntary payments that the payor spouse cannot deduct.
I.R.C. § 71(b)(1)(A) (1988).
17. I.R.C. § 71(b)(1)(B) (1988).
18. The former spouses cannot, however, treat non-qualifying payments as alimony.
1994]
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If the former spouses have already executed a written separation
agreement, they may subsequently designate qualifying alimony
payments as non-alimony if this designation is made in a separate
writing that refers to the original separation agreement. 19 Addi-
tionally, if one of the spouses is providing support under a tempo-
rary support order and both spouses wish to treat the support pay-
ments as excludible from the payee spouse's gross income and
nondeductible by the payor spouse, they must make such a desig-
nation in the original or subsequent temporary support order.20 If
the spouses choose to make the non-alimony election, the payee
spouse must attach a copy of the divorce or separation instrument
containing such designation to the payee spouse's income tax re-
turn for each year in which the former spouses make the election. 21
The spouses have until the filing deadline, April 15 of the fol-
lowing calendar year, to decide whether to make the non-alimony
election.22 The spouses can change this election from year to year.23
Any change, however, requires the spouses to amend the divorce or
separation instrument, unless the instrument specifically contains
a clause that provides for such changes from year to year.2 4
D. Spouses Cannot Be Members of the Same Household
For payments to qualify as alimony for purposes of deducting
them from the payor spouse's gross income, former spouses who
are legally separated under a decree of divorce or separate mainte-
nance are prohibited from living in the same household when the
alimony or separate maintenance payments are made.26 Even if
both "spouses physically separate themselves within the dwelling
unit," the Internal Revenue Service (the Service) considers a
dwelling unit shared by both spouses to constitute one household.26
The Service, however, does not treat spouses as members of the
See I.R.C. § 71(b)(1)(B).
19. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1T(b), Q & A-8 (1984).
20. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-IT(b), Q & A-8. The Code defines a temporary support
order as "a decree . . . requiring a spouse to make payments for the support or maintenance
of the other spouse." I.R.C. § 71(b)(2)(C) (1988).
21. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1T(b), Q & A-8.
22. I.R.C. § 6072(a) (1988).
23. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1T(b), Q & A-8.
24. Jerome M. Hesch, Divorce and Separation, 95-5th Tax Mgmt. (BNA) A-5 (1989).
25. I.R.C. § 71(b)(1)(C) (1988). The Seventh Circuit has strictly construed the "sepa-
rate residences" requirement. In Coltman v. Commissioner, 980 F.2d 1134, 1136 (7th Cir.
1992), the Seventh Circuit held that because the taxpayer was residing in his estranged
wife's residence three days a week while actively pursuing a divorce, he could not deduct
any of the payments that he made to her during this period.
26. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-IT(b), Q & A-9 (1984).
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same household if one spouse is preparing to depart and does de-
part no later than one month after the payment is made.2 7 None-
theless, if the spouses are not legally separated under a decree of
divorce or separate maintenance, payments that the payee spouse
receives pursuant to a written separation agreement or temporary
support order qualify as alimony or separate maintenance and
must be included in the payee spouse's gross income regardless of
whether the spouses are living together at the time the payments
are made.28
E. Support Obligations Must Terminate on the Death of
Payee Spouse
For support payments to qualify as alimony for tax purposes,
the divorce or separation instrument must not state that such pay-
ments continue after the payee spouse's death.29 If a payor spouse
is obligated to make support payments after the payee spouse's
death, none of the payments, whether made before or after the
payee spouse's death, qualifies as alimony or separate maintenance
for tax purposes. 0 If the divorce or separation instrument requires
the payor spouse to make one or more payments in cash or prop-
erty after the payee spouse's death as a substitute for the continu-
ation of pre-death alimony payments, none of the payments that
the payor spouse makes before or after the payee spouse's death
will qualify as alimony for tax purposes.31 "Substitute payments"
are any payments that "begin to be made, increase in amount, or
become accelerated in time as a result of the death of the payee
spouse." 32
The divorce decree or separation agreement, however, does not
need to state specifically that support payments will terminate
upon the payee spouse's death. The existence of a state law that
terminates support payments on the death of the payee spouse
alone satisfies this requirement.
27. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-lT(b), Q & A-9.
28. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-IT(b), Q & A-9.
29. I.R.C. § 71(b)(1)(D) (1988); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1T(b), Q & A-11 (1984).
30. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-lT(b), Q & A-10 (1984).
31. I.R.C. § 71(b)(1)(D); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-IT(b), Q & A-13 (1984).
32. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-lT(b), Q & A-14 (1984).
33. I.R.C. § 71(b)(1)(D). The previous version of I.R.C. § 71(b)(1)(D) required that
the divorce or separation instrument state that there is no liability for payments after the
payee spouse's death. This version was repealed by Public Law No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085
(1986).
34. I.R.S. Notice 87-9, 1987-1 C.B. 421. Montana law provides that the obligation to
pay maintenance terminates on the death of either former spouse unless otherwise agreed in
writing or in the divorce decree. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-208(4) (1993).
1994]
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Conversely, the Code does not require that support payments
cease upon the payee spouse's remarriage or the payor spouse's
death. Support payments may continue after the occurrence of ei-
ther of these events and still receive alimony treatment. However,
whether support payments continue after the payee spouse remar-
ries or after the payor spouse dies is a question that the divorce
decree or separation agreement should address. If the instrument
fails to address these issues, state law governs.
Montana law terminates the payor spouse's support obligation
upon the remarriage of the payee spouse or the death of the payor
spouse unless the spouses agree or the court provides otherwise in
the divorce decree or separation agreement or in another writing.3 5
However, determination of alimony for state law purposes may dif-
fer substantially from a determination of alimony for tax purposes.
The divorce decree or separation agreement should, therefore, spe-
cifically address these questions rather than allow state law to gov-
ern by default.
III. CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS
In addition to the requirements discussed above, a payment
must avoid classification as child support if it is to qualify as ali-
mony or separate maintenance. If the divorce decree or separation
agreement fixes an amount for the support of the payor spouse's
children, that amount will not constitute alimony or separate
maintenance payments for tax purposes.36 As a result, child sup-
port payments are not includable in the payee spouse's income and
are not deductible by the payor spouse. 7
The divorce decree or separation agreement does not need to
refer to a specific dollar amount for a payment to be fixed as child
support. Courts have construed the word "fix" in I.R.C. 71(c)(1) to
mean that the total actual payments made by the payor spouse
under the divorce or separation instrument can be precisely allo-
cated between child support and alimony." Thus, child support
payments may fluctuate from year to year and yet still be fixed
under the Code.39 However, if the Service cannot determine from
35. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-208(4).
36. I.R.C. § 71(c)(1) (1988). If the divorce decree or separation agreement requires the
payor spouse to pay a certain amount of child support and a certain amount of alimony, and
the payor spouse's actual support payment is less than the two amounts combined, the Code
requires the former spouses to apply the payment first to child support and the remainder
to alimony. I.R.C. § 71(c)(3) (1988).
37. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1T(c), Q & A-15 (1984).
38. See, e.g., Abramo v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 154, 161 (1982).
39. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1T(c), Q & A-16 (1984).
364 [Vol. 55
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the language of the written instrument how much of each payment
constitutes child support, the Service treats the entire payment as
alimony.40
If the separation agreement or divorce decree provides for a
reduction in support payments upon the happening of a contin-
gency related to the child, the Code classifies the amount of the
reduction as child support.41 For a reduction in payments to qual-
ify as child support, the separation agreement or divorce decree
must specify the particular contingency that relates to the child.
Examples of such contingencies include the child's attaining a
specified age or income level, the child's marrying, dying, leaving
school, leaving the payee spouse's household, and obtaining
employment.' 2
If the separation agreement or divorce decree does not specify
the contingency relating to the child, the Service may, nonetheless,
treat a reduction in payments as child support if it finds that the
payments are reduced "at a time which can clearly be associated
with a contingency" relating to the child.43 The Treasury Regula-
tions specifically indicate two situations in which the Service
presumes that a reduction in payments is associated with a contin-
gency relating to the child. The first situation involves the reduc-
tion of payments "not more than 6 months before or after the date
the child is to attain the age of 18, 21, or local age of majority."44
The second situation deals with the reduction of payments "on two
or more occasions which occur not more than one year before or
after a different child of the payor spouse attains a certain age be-
tween the ages of 18 and 24, inclusive."'' 5 The certain age referred
to above "must be the same for each such child, but need not be a
whole number of years."' "4
40. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-42-122 (1981).
41. I.R.C. § 71(c)(2) (1988).
42. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1T(c), Q & A-17 (1984).
43. I.R.C. § 71(c)(2)(B) (1988).
44. Temp. Tress. Reg. § 1.71-1T(c), Q & A-18 (1984).
45. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1T(c), Q & A-18.
46. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1T(c), Q & A-18. The example in Temporary Treasury
Regulation, § 1.71-1T(c), Q & A-18 provides a good illustration of the second situation in
which the Service presumes that a reduction in support payments is clearly associated with
the happening of a contingency relating to a child of the payor spouse. In that example, A
and B divorce when their children, C and D, are 14 and 12, respectively. Pursuant to the
divorce decree, A is required to make alimony payments to B of $2,000 per month. Such
payments decrease to $1,500 per month approximately five and one-half years after the di-
vorce and to $1,000 per month approximately nine and one-half years after the divorce. At
the time, the alimony payments decrease to $1,500 per month, C will be 20 years, 5 months,
and 17 days old. At the time, the alimony payments decrease to $1,000 per month, D will be
22 years, 3 months, and 9 days old. Consequently, each of the reductions in payments occurs
1994] 365
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Although these two situations create a presumption that a re-
duction in support payments is associated with a contingency re-
lating to the child, the presumption can be rebutted by a showing
that the date for reduction was independent of any contingencies
relating to the child. 7 Thus, in the first circumstance, the former
spouses or the Service can conclusively rebut the presumption by
showing that the reduction in support payments will result in the
complete elimination of alimony "during the sixth post-separation
year... or upon the expiration of a 72-month period. ' 48 Moreover,
the former spouses or the Service can rebut the presumptions if
the local custom is to cease alimony payments after a certain pe-
riod such as a period equal to one-half the duration of the
marriage.49
Although the former spouses can elect to treat qualifying ali-
mony or separate maintenance payments as non-alimony for fed-
eral income tax purposes, they cannot make a similar election that
will classify child support payments as alimony.50 The former
spouses, however, can assure that payments will qualify for ali-
mony treatment by satisfying the requirements of alimony as pre-
scribed by the Code and by ensuring that the payments are not
fixed as child support in the divorce decree or separation agree-
ment. Furthermore, the former spouses can prevent the treatment
of payments as child support by providing in the divorce decree or
separation agreement that payments will not be reduced upon the
happening of a contingency related to the child or at a time that
can be associated with a contingency related to the child. 51 Thus,
careful drafting on the part of the former spouses should prevent
the Service from treating certain payments by the payor spouse as
child support rather than alimony.
IV. EXCESS FRONT-LOADING OF ALIMONY
Since the Code allows the payor spouse to deduct alimony
not more than one year before or after a different child reaches the age of 21 years and 4
months old. Thus, the reduction in payments of $1,000 per month will be treated as fixed
for the support of the children of A and will not qualify for alimony.
47. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1T(c), Q & A-18.
48. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1T(c), Q & A-18. The sixth post-separation year refers
to the sixth year of "6 consecutive calendar years beginning with the first calendar year in
which the payor [spouse] pays to the payee [spouse] an alimony or separate maintenance
payment." Temp. Tress. Reg. § 1.71-IT(d), Q & A-22 (1984).
49. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-IT(c), Q & A-18.
50. Neither the Code nor the Treasury Regulations provide for an election to treat
child support payments as alimony.
51. See Temp. Tress. Reg. § 1.71-1T(c), Q & A-16.
[Vol. 55
8
Montana Law Review, Vol. 55 [1994], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol55/iss2/3
TAX CONSEQUENCES
payments from gross income,52 the payor spouse may attempt to
disguise all or part of the property settlement payments as ali-
mony. This can be accomplished by adding the amount allocated
to property settlement to the amount allocated to alimony and
designating the entire amount as alimony in the separation agree-
ment or divorce decree. The spouse receiving the excess alimony
payments generally accepts the unfavorable tax consequences. 3
For example, the payee spouse may not be fully advised of the tax
law, may be in a low enough tax bracket that the additional in-
come would not have a large impact, or may be pressured to do so
by the payor spouse. To prevent such abuses, Congress enacted
I.R.C. § 71(f), a particularly complex area of the Code. Section
71(f) tries to properly classify alimony payments and property set-
tlements by using restrictions on what the Code refers to as "ex-
cess front-loading of alimony payments."'54 Congress enacted the
current law in 198455 and simplified it in 1988,56 yet it remains one
of the most confusing provisions in the Code.
A. Calculation of Excess Front-Loading
Excess front-loading of alimony occurs when the payor spouse
makes greater "alimony" payments in post-separation years one
and two, than in year three.5 7 The Service chose the three-year pe-
riod to separate the types of payments because property settle-
ments are traditionally paid within a short time after the divorce
decree or decree of legal separation and are substantially higher
than the remaining alimony payments. The rule also established a
$15,000 threshold amount to eliminate recapture on payment fluc-
tuations less than that amount.58
The impact of I.R.C. § 71(f) on the taxpayer can be substan-
tial. This section requires the payor spouse to include in gross in-
come the excess portion of alimony that I.R.C. § 71(f) determines
52. I.R.C. § 215(a) (1988).
53. The recipient must include in gross income all alimony payments received. I.R.C.
§ 71(a) (1988).
54. I.R.C. § 71(f) (1988).
55. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984).
56. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986).
57. "[T]he term '1st post-separation years' means the 1st calendar year in which the
payor spouse paid to the payee spouse alimony or separate maintenance payments. The 2nd
and 3rd post-separation years [are] the 1st and 2nd succeeding calendar years respectively."
I.R.C. § 71(f)(6) (1988).
58. I.R.C. § 71(f)(3)(B)(ii) & (4)(B)(ii) (1988). The threshold amount is an arbitrary
"de minimis" amount allowing for fluctuations in payments that would otherwise trigger
recapture.
1994]
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actually to be part of the property settlement.59 This amount is
deemed to be recaptured because the taxpayer deducted it with
the true alimony payments in post-separation years one and two.
Likewise, the Code allows the payee spouse to deduct from gross
income the amount determined to be excess front-loading of ali-
mony.60 The payee spouse is allowed a deduction in post-separa-
tion year three, because the payee spouse included in gross income
in post-separation years one and two amounts attributable to the
property settlement, which are not includible in gross income.6
For example, assume the payor spouse agrees to pay the payee
spouse alimony over a period of ten years. The taxpayers agree
that the property settlement shall be $50,000 and alimony shall be
$30,000 a year for ten years for a total of $350,000. The divorce
decree or separation agreement calls for the payor spouse to pay
$60,000 the first year, $50,000 the second year, and $30,000 for the
remaining eight years. The amount of excess front-loading of ali-
mony would be calculated as follows:
Determination of the amount of 2nd-year recapture 2
2nd-year payment $ 50,000 (A)
3rd-year payment - 30,000 (B)
Excess $ 20,000
Threshold amount6  - 15,000
Amount recaptured $ 5,000 (C)
Determination of the amount of a 3rd-year recapture6'
1st-year payment $ 60,000
Average of 2nd- & 37,500
3rd-year payments
[(A + B - C)/2]65
Excess 22,500
Threshold amount66  15,000
Amount recaptured $ 7,500
59. I.R.C. § 71(0; see Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-IT(d) (1984) (dealing generally with
excess front-loading rules).
60. I.R.C. § 71(f)(1)(B) (1988).
61. I.R.C. § 71(c)(1) (1988).
62. I.R.C. § 71(f)(4) (1988).
63. I.R.C. § 71(f)(4)(B) (ii) (1988).
64. I.R.C. § 71(f)(3) (1988).
65. To determine the average, one must add both the second and third post-separation
year payments, less any amount recaptured from the second year. This requires the calcula-
tion of the second-year recapture before making the third-year determination.
66. I.R.C. § 71(f)(3)(B) (ii) (1988).
[Vol. 55368
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The excess front-loading provision of I.R.C. § 71(f) occasion-
ally comes into effect even where no property settlement amounts
are involved. For example, often the payee spouse receives addi-
tional alimony in the years immediately following the divorce. The
payor spouse generally pays this additional amount to allow the
payee spouse to obtain a certain position or salary level in a partic-
ular job, to earn a bachelor or masters degree, or to start a new
business. These additional payments, generally termed "rehabilita-
tive alimony," usually last for a few years immediately following
separation. Even though these payments are not related to a prop-
erty settlement, because they produce larger alimony payments in
the first two years after separation, I.R.C. § 71(f) may classify such
payment as excess front-loading of alimony.17
B. Planning Strategies to Avoid the Pitfalls of Excess Front-
Loading
Planning strategies to avoid the effects of I.R.C. § 71(f)'8 are
particularly important for two reasons. First, the payor spouse may
experience a significant tax burden by adding two years of deduc-
tions to the third post-separation year's taxable income. 9 Second,
the payor spouse can avoid taxes imposed under I.R.C. § 71(f) al-
together, merely by planning ahead. As we will see with the plan-
ning pointers, the cooperation of both spouses is essential in avoid-
ing the application of I.R.C. § 71(f). Therefore, the agreement
should be prepared with both taxpayers' interests in mind.
The most obvious planning pointer is to specify in the separa-
tion agreement or divorce decree that the alimony payments re-
main constant for the first three years after divorce. Since I.R.C.
§ 71(f) only concerns discrepancies between the first two years and
the third post-separation year, any excess amount should be
spread over three years.70 The payor spouse thus can avoid the im-
pact of I.R.C. § 71(f) altogether and still make the additional pay-
ments over a relatively short period of time.7 ' Also, if the former
spouses desire a lump-sum payment, the divorce decree or separa-
tion agreement should provide for the payment to be made no ear-
67. I.R.C. § 71(f). As we have seen, § 71(f) includes all "alimony" payments in the
excess front-loading calculation.
68. I.R.C. § 71(f).
69. The additional income has the potential to push the payor spouse into a higher tax
bracket.
70. As discussed, several reasons exist why former spouses wish to front-load pay-
ments, including property settlement, rehabilitative alimony, and payments made for other
matters.
71. Three tax years following divorce.
1994]
11
Peete and Coffee: Tax Consequences of Divorce and Legal Separation
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1994
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
lier than third year after divorce, so that the payment will not pro-
duce a significant fluctuation in alimony payments in the first two
years.
Section 71(f) of the Code allows a limited amount of front-
loading without recapture. The provision allows for variation in
amounts of alimony paid up to a threshold amount of $15,000 per
year.72  Tax experts have devised a "maximum acceleration"
formula to enable the taxpayer to take full advantage of the
threshold amount. 73
Applying the maximum acceleration formula to our earlier ex-
ample produces the following calculations. Subtract $37,500 from
the total property settlement of $50,000 to arrive at $12,500. Di-
vide the $12,500 by three to reach the base amount of $4,167. 7,
Adding this base amount to the variation adjustments and the ali-
mony payment, the formula yields a payment of $56,666 7 in the
first year, $49,16771 in the second year, and $34,16777 in the third
post-separation year. Applying these figures to our excess front-
loading recapture formula, we have the following:
72. I.R.C. § 71(f)(3)(B)(ii), (4)(B)(ii).
73. Hesch, supra note 24, at A-8. The formula requires:
Starting with the [total] property settlement amount, subtract $37,500 and
divide the remaining portion by three. This gives a base amount to be paid each
year. Add $22,500 [first-year variation adjustment] to the base amount for the
first year's payment and $15,000 [second-year variation adjustment] for the sec-
ond year's payment.
These amounts are added to any amount of actual alimony that will remain the same over
at least the three post-separation years.
74. Due to rounding, the amount attributable to the first year is $4,166, and the
amount attributable to the second and third years is $4,167 each.
75. Combine $22,500 with $4,166 for the property settlement portion and $30,000 for
alimony.
76. Combine $15,000 with $4,167 for the property settlement portion and $30,000 for
alimony.
77. The base year amount of $4,167 for the property settlement portion and alimony
of $30,000.
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Determination of the amount of 2nd-year recapture
2nd-year payment $ 49,167 (A)
3rd-year payment - 34,167 (B)
Excess $ 15,000
Threshold amount - 15,000
Amount recaptured $ -0- (C)
Determination of the amount of 3rd-year recapture
1st-year payment $ 56,666
Average of 2nd- & - 41,667
3rd- year payment
[(A + B - C)/2]
Excess $ 14,999
Threshold amount - 15,000
Amount Recaptured $ -0-
Using the maximum acceleration formula has obvious advan-
tages. By applying the formula, the payor spouse can avoid recap-
ture in the third post-separation year. Moreover, this formula allo-
cates most of the property settlement amounts between the first
two post-separation years by taking full advantage of the threshold
amounts.
Even if recapture of excess front-loading of alimony cannot be
avoided, one or both of the taxpayers may still benefit by including
property settlement amounts in their alimony payments. A payor
spouse can defer recognition of income by taking deductions in
post-separation years one and two and postponing recapture until
post-separation year three. Several advantages may flow from this
strategy. First, the payor spouse may attempt in year one to reduce
gross income to allow a higher deduction for itemized deductions, 8
including legal expenses incidental to divorce. 9 Second, the payor
spouse may anticipate little or no income in year three, for exam-
ple, due to retirement or sale of assets in prior years. Under such a
scenario, the recapture would not seriously impact the amount of
the payor spouse's tax liability. Finally, even though significant re-
capture is required, the payor spouse may benefit from the deferral
of taxes in years one and two, when taking into consideration cash
flow and the time value of money.
Front-loading also can benefit the payee spouse. The payee
spouse may be in a situation where taxable income is low in the
78. For further discussion of itemized deductions, see infra part IV.C.
79. Tress. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(7) (1988).
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first two years following divorce, for example, due to school or a
new job. Also, the payee spouse may be starting a new profession
or new business and would be in a lower tax bracket initially, with
gross income increasing over time. Thus, the payee spouse could
benefit from the third-year deduction for excess front-loading.80
C. Exceptions to the Excess Front-Loading Rule
The Code provides several exceptions to avoid the effects of
the excess front-loading rule.81 First, if payments cease because the
payee spouse either dies or remarries before the end of the third
year following divorce, the excess front-loading rule does not ap-
ply.82 The second exception occurs when a temporary support or-
der requires the payor spouse to make certain payments to the
payee spouse for support or maintenance.83 This exception pre-
vents the taxpayer from being penalized for court-ordered pay-
ments that trigger recapture. The third exception to the excess
front-loading rule relates to fluctuation payments over which the
payor spouse lacks control.84 These payments must relate to "por-
tions of the income from a business or property or from compensa-
tion for employment or self-employment. ' 85 In other words, tax-
payers are exempt from I.R.C. § 71(f) when a payee spouse
receives a percentage of the payor spouse's profit and, theoreti-
cally, neither spouse has control over that amount.
The importance of planning is apparent, given the potential
harm of recapture and the ease with which it can be avoided. Con-
sequently, practitioners should attempt to create an agreement ac-
ceptable to both parties while avoiding I.R.C. § 71(f).
V. ALIMONY TRUSTS
Rather than paying alimony periodically, former spouses may
agree that the payor spouse will establish and fund an alimony
trust, naming the payee spouse as beneficiary. Under this arrange-
ment the payee spouse will receive the income generated from the
trust's assets (the trust principal). The Service taxes the payee
80. Under this theory, the payee spouse could be in the 15% tax bracket in the first
and second post-separation years, and then in the third post-separation year earn enough to
be subject to the 36% tax bracket before receiving the excess front-loading deduction.
81. I.R.C. § 71(f)(5) (1988); see Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1T(d), Q & A-25 (1984).
82. I.R.C. § 71(f)(5)(A) (1988).
83. I.R.C. § 71(f)(5)(B) (1988); see also Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-1T(d), Q & A-21
(1984). Payments made under a divorce decree or separation agreement are entirely ex-
cluded from the excess front-loading rules. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.71-LT(d), Q & A-25.
84. I.R.C. § 71(f)(5)(C) (1988).
85. I.R.C. § 71(f)(5)(C).
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spouse on the income generated by the trust instead of taxing the
payor spouse who established the trust.8 The Code, however, does
not allow the payor spouse to claim a deduction for trust payments
made to the payee spouse .1
A divorced couple may prefer an alimony trust to other meth-
ods that are used to provide support to the payee spouse. Estab-
lishing an alimony trust guarantees the payee spouse a series of
future alimony payments. Such a trust eliminates any risk involv-
ing the payor spouse's ability to make alimony or separate mainte-
nance payments in the future. Furthermore, appointment of a
competent trustee can ensure that the trust principal is properly
managed and invested to maximize return.88
Setting up and fully funding an alimony trust should relieve
the payor spouse of the obligation to provide further support to
the payee spouse. To ensure that the principal of the trust is avail-
able solely for the payee spouse's support, the trust should be ir-
revocable. Nevertheless, the trust instrument should provide that
the trust shall terminate and principal shall revert to the payor
spouse when support payments are no longer necessary. Because
the grantor trust rules do not apply to alimony trusts, the payor
spouse does not have to include trust income in gross income even
though the payor spouse receives the trust principal at some future
date."9
The payor spouse may use the alimony trust as a vehicle to
avoid the pitfalls of recapturing alimony payments under the ex-
cess front-loading rule. Generally, the income generated by a trust
is fixed or varies only slightly from year to year. As long as this
variation is not greater than $15,000 a year within the three years
following divorce or legal separation, the Code does not require re-
capture of alimony payments.90 Additionally, when the trust's prin-
cipal produces fluctuating amounts of income each year and these
fluctuations are beyond the payor spouse's control, the income gen-
erated by the trust may qualify under an exception to the excess
front-loading rule.91
86. I.R.C. § 682(a) (1988) (providing the payor spouse must, however, pay tax on trust
income to the extent that the divorce decree, separation agreement, or trust instrument
specifies that a certain amount is for the support of the payor spouse's children).
87. I.R.C. § 215(d) (1988).
88. The payor spouse, a bank, and a trust company are examples of trustees for an
alimony trust.
89. See I.R.C. § 682(a); Trees. Reg. 1.682(a)-l(a)(3) (1957).
90. I.R.C. § 71(f) (1988).
91. I.R.C. § 71(f)(5)(C) (1988) (applying exception to payments that vary in amount
because they are based on a fixed portion of income from a business, property, or compensa-
tion from employment or self-employment).
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The Code taxes alimony trusts and their beneficiaries in the
same manner as the Code taxes most trusts and beneficiaries.2
The trust must include the income generated by the trust principal
within its own gross income for the taxable year.93 The trust, how-
ever, may deduct any income distributions made to the beneficiary
to the extent the distributions do not exceed the trust's distributa-
ble net income.9 " The beneficiary of the alimony trust must include
the income distributions from the trust within gross income.9 If
the income distributions exceed the trust's distributable net in-
come, the excess amount passes tax-free to the beneficiary." Fi-
nally, the income earned by the trust retains its same character as
it passes through to the beneficiary.9 7
In setting up an alimony trust, the practitioner should keep in
mind the objectives that the client wishes to achieve. The payor
spouse wants to establish a trust that generates sufficient income
to satisfy the support obligation. The payee spouse wants a trust
established to provide for financial needs. To ensure that these
goals are met, the practitioner should select a competent and fi-
nancially astute trustee. A bank or trust company may satisfy such
criteria. Moreover, the practitioner should ensure that the payor
spouse transfers sufficient assets to the trust to provide a consis-
tent and adequate income stream to the payee spouse.
Finally, the payor spouse wants the income distributions from
the trust to qualify as alimony or separate maintenance payments.
To prevent the trust income from being characterized as child sup-
port, the payor spouse should avoid reductions in the amount of
the income distributions based on the age of the children. Further-
more, to avoid the appearance of a property settlement transfer,
the practitioner should draft a clause in the trust instrument that
causes the trust principal to revert to the payor spouse on the
payee spouse's death or remarriage. If both the payor and payee
spouse take such matters into consideration, they will avoid the
prospect of future litigation.
92. See I.R.C. § 682(b) (1988).
93. See I.R.C. § 641(b) (1988).
94. I.R.C. §§ 651, 661 (1988). Section 651 of the Code applies to a trust that is re-
quired to distribute all of its income currently. Section 661 of the Code applies to a trust
that is allowed to accumulate income and/or distribute corpus.
95. I.R.C. § 652(a) (1988).
96. I.R.C. § 652(a). "Distributable net income" is defined as the trust's taxable income
with certain modifications. I.R.C. § 643(a) (1988).
97. I.R.C. § 652(b) (1988). For example, if the income generated by the trust principal
constitutes tax-exempt interest, the income will be characterized as tax-exempt interest in
the hands of the beneficiary.
[Vol. 55
16
Montana Law Review, Vol. 55 [1994], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol55/iss2/3
TAX CONSEQUENCES
VI. PROPERTY SETTLEMENTS
When a cash payment or property transfer between former
spouses does not satisfy the requirements of alimony or child sup-
port, the Service treats the payment or transfer as a property set-
tlement.9 The Code views such a transfer of property as a gift for
income tax purposes.9 9 Thus, the payor spouse may not deduct the
fair market value of the property transferred in determining taxa-
ble income, °0 and the payee spouse does not include the fair mar-
ket value of such property in gross income. 101
Because the Code characterizes a property settlement transfer
as a gift, the payee spouse takes a basis in the property equal to
the payor spouse's basis immediately before the transfer. 102 Addi-
tionally, the payee spouse determines the holding period in the
property by including the payor spouse's holding period in the
property prior to the transfer.103 These rules are best illustrated by
an example. Payor spouse (A) owns a capital asset with a basis of
$100,000. A holds the asset for seven months before A transfers it
to payee spouse (B). The fair market value of the asset at the time
of transfer is $110,000. B holds the asset for six months and then
sells it to a third party for $125,000. B recognizes $25,000 of long-
term capital gain. Upon receipt of the asset, B takes A's basis of
$100,000, not a basis equal to the asset's fair market value at the
time of the transfer."0 Furthermore, B's gain on the sale is long-
term capital gain because A and B's combined holding period in
the property exceeded one year. 105
The Code prevents the recognition of gain or loss on a transfer
of property between current spouses and former spouses. 08 The
98. A property transfer never qualifies as alimony because the payor spouse must
make alimony payments in the form of cash. I.R.C. § 71(b)(1) (1988). See generally I.R.S.
PUBLICATION 504, Divorced or Separated Individuals 11-13 (1992).
99. I.R.C. § 1041(b)(1) (1988).
100. See I.R.C. § 215(a) (1988). This provision allows the payor spouse to deduct pay-
ments that qualify as alimony or separate maintenance. Section 215(b) of the Code defines
"alimony or separate maintenance payments" as those payments that the payee spouse
must include in gross income under § 71. This definition does not include payments that
qualify as property settlement transfers. I.R.C. § 71(b) (1988).
101. I.R.C. § 1041(a) (1988).
102. I.R.C. § 1041(b)(2) (1988); see also Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-1T(d), Q & A-11
(1984). If there is any appreciation in the property at the time of the transfer, the payee
spouse will recognize gain on a subsequent sale of the property. I.R.C. § 1001(a), (c) (1988).
103. I.R.C. § 1223(2) (1988). The payor spouse must "supply the [payee spouse] with
records sufficient to determine the adjusted basis and holding period of the property as of
the date of the transfer." Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-1T(e), Q & A-14 (1984).
104. I.R.C. § 1041(b)(2).
105. See I.R.C. §§ 1223(2), 1222(3) (1988).
106. I.R.C. § 1041(a). See generally Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-iT, Q & A-1 (1984).
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nonrecognition treatment on property transfers between former
spouses, however, only occurs on transfers incident to a divorce.'017
The Code mandates that the transfer of property between former
spouses must satisfy one of two criteria for nonrecognition treat-
ment.108 The transfer must either "occur[] within 1 year after the
date on which the marriage ceases"' 09 or be "related to the cessa-
tion of the marriage.""' 0
The Service applies the above rules liberally with regard to
transfers between spouses and former spouses. The Temporary
Treasury Regulations in this area provide for nonrecognition treat-
ment even when the transfer involves a sale at arm's length and for
full consideration."' However, spouses or former spouses will not
receive nonrecognition treatment under Section 1041 of the Code if
at the time of the transfer the transferee or payee spouse is a non-
resident alien." 2
Section 1041 of the Code also applies to property transfers be-
tween spouses or former spouses and trusts established for their
benefit."3 However, if the transferor/payor spouse transfers assets
into a trust, and the liabilities assumed by the trust exceed the
assets' total adjusted basis, section 1041 does not apply." 4 Thus, in
this instance, the transferor or payor spouse must recognize gain to
the extent that the liabilities exceed the adjusted basis."' The
amount of gain recognized will be added to the trust's basis in the
assets." 6
The nonrecognition of loss under section 1041 of the Code dif-
fers from the nonrecognition of loss in a typical gift scenario under
section 1015 of the Code." 7 Under section 1041, the transferee or
107. I.R.C. § 1041(a)(2) (1988); see Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-1T(b), Q & A-6
(1984).
108. I.R.C. § 1041(c) (1988).
109. I.R.C. § 1041(c)(1) (1988).
110. I.R.C. § 1041(c)(2) (1988). A transfer of property between former spouses is re-
lated to the cessation of the marriage if "the transfer is pursuant to a divorce or separation
instrument ... and the transfer occurs not more than 6 years after the date on which the
marriage ceases." Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-1T(b), Q & A-7 (1984); see, e.g., Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 93-06-015 (Feb. 22, 1993) (eight years after the divorce is presumably unrelated to the
divorce).
111. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-1T(a), Q & A-2 (1984).
112. I.R.C. § 1041(d) (1988); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-1T(a), Q & A-3 (1984).
113. Transfers to third parties on behalf of their spouse or former spouse may qualify
for nonrecognition treatment, provided that other requirements of § 1041 of the Code are
met. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1041-1T(c) (1984); see, e.g., Arnes v. United States, 981 F.2d 456
(9th Cir. 1992).
114. I.R.C. § 1041(e) (1988).
115. I.R.C. § 1041(e); see Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-1T(d), Q & A-12 (1984).
116. I.R.C. § 1041(e).
117. I.R.C. § 1015(e) (1988).
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payee spouse's basis in the property equals the transferor or payor
spouse's basis in the property immediately before the transfer.11 8
The transferee or payee spouse will use that transferred basis to
determine a loss on a subsequent sale of the property. " " Therefore,
when the transferee spouse sells the property, the transferee
spouse recognizes the same loss as the transferor spouse would
have recognized if the transferor spouse had sold the property for
the same price. For example, A owns property with a basis of
$100,000 and transfers this property to B as provided in the di-
vorce decree. At the time of transfer, the fair market value of the
property is $75,000. Shortly after receipt, B sells the property for
$85,000 and recognizes a $15,000 loss. B's basis in the property
prior to the sale was $100,000-the same basis as A.
Because the Code views property transfers between spouses
and former spouses as gifts, recognition of ordinary income on the
transfer of property subject to depreciation recapture is not re-
quired. 2 0 The Code, however, requires the recapture of deprecia-
tion on disposition of the property.12 1 Thus, because the transferee
spouse has the same adjusted basis in the property as the trans-
122 taferor spouse, the transferee spouse recognizes ordinary income
on a subsequent disposition of the property.1 2 3 With such potential
ordinary income built into the depreciable property transferred be-
tween the former spouses, what may first appear to be a fair prop-
erty settlement agreement may, in fact, result in unfavorable tax
consequences to the payee spouse.
For example, a couple owns a tract of land worth $150,000
with an adjusted basis of $135,000 and business equipment worth
$150,000 with an original purchase price (cost basis) of $100,000
and an adjusted basis of $50,000. Both assets have been held for
more than one year. A receives the land and B receives the equip-
ment pursuant to the property settlement agreement or divorce de-
cree. If A sells the land for its fair market value shortly after the
transfer, A must report a long-term capital gain of $15,000.12' If B
sells the business equipment for its fair market value, B recognizes
118. I.R.C. 9 1041(b)(2); see Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.1041-IT(d), Q & A-11 (1984).
119. I.R.C. § 1001(a), (c) (1988).
120. I.R.C. §9 1245(b)(1), 1250(d)(1) (1988).
121. I.R.C. §9 1245(a)(1), 1250(a)(1) (1988).
122. I.R.C. § 1041(b)(2).
123. I.R.C. 99 1245(a)(1), 1250(a)(1).
124. If the land was held for investment, A will report $15,000 of long-term capital
gain pursuant to §§ 1221 and 1222(3) of the Code. If the land was used in a trade or busi-
ness, A will report $15,000 of long-term capital gain. I.R.C. § 1231(a)(1) (1988).
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$50,000 of ordinary income"2 ' and $50,000 of section 1231 gain. 126
The above example illustrates the adverse tax consequences
created by section 1041 and the significance of basis in drafting a
fair property settlement agreement. The practitioner should con-
sider the client's potential tax liability when giving advice with re-
spect to a property settlement. Additionally, the practitioner
should determine the length of time the client intends to hold the
property received in a dissolution of marriage. If the client desires
to sell the property immediately after receipt, the practitioner
should attempt to allocate long-term capital gain property to the
client. Such an allocation under the property settlement agreement
allows the client to receive favorable tax treatment on a later sale
of the property.
A practitioner representing a spouse during a dissolution of
marriage should draft a property settlement agreement in a man-
ner that ensures full compliance with I.R.C. § 1041. Compliance
allows former spouses to defer the recognition of gain and to shift
the tax attributes of property to the spouse who can derive the
greatest tax benefit.
VII. DEPENDENCY EXEMPTION
A dissolution of marriage can have collateral tax effects on for-
mer spouses with children. The Code permits a taxpayer to claim a
dependency deduction for each child who qualifies as a depen-
dent. 2 7 Following a divorce, only one of the former spouses, how-
ever, can claim the child as a dependent on an income tax re-
turn.1 28 The Code specifically addresses this situation by providing
rules for determining which spouse is entitled to the dependency
deduction.12
125. The $50,000 of ordinary income represents the difference between the equip-
ment's recomputed basis of $100,000 and its adjusted basis of $50,000. I.R.C.
§ 1245(a)(1)(A) (1988).
126. The section 1231 gain of $50,000 will be characterized as long-term capital gain if
B's § 1231 gains exceed § 1231 losses for the taxable year. I.R.C. § 1231(a)(1).
127. I.R.C. § 151(c) (1988). The taxpayer may take a dependency deduction if the
taxpayer provides over half of the child's support and the child is either under 19 years of
age or is a student under 24 years of age. I.R.C. §§ 151(c)(1)(B), 152(a)(1) (1988). The tax-
payer may also take a dependency deduction if the taxpayer provides over half of the child's
support and the child's gross income for the calendar year is less than the amount of the
dependency exemption. I.R.C. §§ 151(c)(1)(A), 152(a)(1) (1988).
128. A state district court may assign the dependency exemption to either parent in
the decree of dissolution if the court finds that such assignment is in the best interests of
the children and the parents. In re Marriage of Milesnick, 235 Mont. 88, 94, 765 P.2d 751,
754-55 (1988).
129. See I.R.C. § 152(e) (1988).
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In the case of divorced parents, the Code grants the depen-
dency exemption to the parent who has custody of the child for the
greater portion of the calendar year.13 For the custodial parent
rule to apply, three conditions must be satisfied. First, the di-
vorced parents, in the aggregate, must provide more than one-half
of the child's support during the calendar year.131 Second, the par-
ents must be: (1) "divorced or legally separated under a decree of
divorce or separate maintenance," (2) "separated under a written
separation agreement," or (3) "liv[ing] apart at all times during the
last 6 months of the calendar year. 13 2 Third, one or both parents
must have custody of the child for more than one-half of the calen-
dar year.133
The noncustodial parent, however, may claim the dependency
exemption under certain circumstances. The noncustodial parent is
entitled to the dependency exemption if the custodial parent signs
a written declaration relinquishing the right to the exemption3
and the noncustodial parent attaches this written statement to the
income tax return for the taxable year in which the noncustodial
parent claims the dependency deduction. 135 This transfer of the
dependency deduction may result in significant tax savings to the
noncustodial parent if that parent is in a higher income tax
bracket.
A noncustodial parent may also claim a dependency deduction
when a multiple support agreement is in effect."3 " A multiple sup-
port agreement is in effect when four requirements are met. First,
the child must not have received more than one-half of the support
from any one person.3 ' Second, the child must have received over
one-half of the support from two or more persons, each of whom
130. I.R.C. § 152(e)(1) (1988).
131. I.R.C. § 152(e)(1)(A) (1988).
132. I.R.C. § 152(e)(1)(A).
133. I.R.C. § 152(e)(1)(B) (1988). Even if the non-custodial parent provides more than
one half of the child's support for the calendar year, the custodial parent will still receive
the tax benefit of the dependency deduction. See I.R.C. § 152(e)(1).
134. The custodial parent may release to the noncustodial parent a claim to the de-
pendency exemption for a single year, for a specified number of years, or for all future years.
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.152-4T(a), Q & A-4 (1984). The custodial parent releases the right to
the dependency exemption by completing and signing IRS Form 8332.
135. I.R.C. § 152(e)(2). The Tax Court disallowed a noncustodial parent's dependency
exemption after finding that the noncustodial parent failed to the income tax return the
custodial parent's release to attach. Nieto v. Commissioner, 92 T.C.M. (RIA) 296 (1992). If
the noncustodial parent intends to claim the dependency exemption for subsequent taxable
years, the taxpayer must attach a copy of the custodial parent's written release to the return
for future taxable years. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.152-4T(a), Q & A-4.
136. I.R.C. § 152(e)(3) (1988).
137. I.R.C. § 152(c)(1) (1988).
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would have been able to claim the child as a dependent on an in-
come tax return if that person would have provided that child with
more than one-half of the support. 138 Third, the person claiming
the dependency deduction must have provided more than ten per-
cent of the child's support."' 9 Fourth, all other persons who are
eligible to claim the dependency deduction must file written state-
ments waiving their right to the dependency exemption. 140 If the
noncustodial parent claims the dependency deduction when a mul-
tiple support agreement is in effect, the noncustodial parent must
attach these written statements to the income tax return.14 1
Finally, the noncustodial parent may be entitled to the depen-
dency exemption if the noncustodial parent has entered into a
qualified pre-1985 instrument with the former spouse. 142 The Code
defines a "qualified pre-1985 instrument" as any divorce decree or
separation agreement which became effective prior to January 1,
1985, and which states that the noncustodial parent can claim the
child as a dependent on the income tax return. 43 However, before
taking a dependency deduction pursuant to a qualified pre-1985
instrument, the noncustodial parent must have provided the child
with $600 of support for the calendar year at issue.14 4
Using a dependency exemption may result in significant tax
savings. As a result, the general practitioner should advise the cli-
ent of the potential tax consequences of claiming a dependency ex-
emption or transferring the exemption to the former spouse. If the
practitioner advises the client to release the client's right to the
dependency exemption, the practitioner should be certain that the
client receives from the former spouse some form of compensation
that is at least equal to the tax cost of surrendering the exemption.
Such an arrangement ensures that both parties receive equitable
income tax treatment after the dissolution of marriage.
138. I.R.C. § 152(c)(2) (1988). Section 152(a) of the Code lists the individuals who
qualify as dependents of the taxpayer if the taxpayer provided over one-half of the individ-
ual's support. I.R.C. § 152(a) (1988).
139. I.R.C. § 152(c)(3) (1988).
140. I.R.C. § 152(c)(4) (1988). Those persons who decide not to claim the person as a
dependent must sign I.R.S. Form 2120. Tress. Reg. § 1.152-3(c) (as amended in 1963).
141. Treas. Reg. § 1.152-3(c).
142. See I.R.C. § 152(e)(4) (1988).
143. I.R.C. § 152(e)(4)(B)(i)-(ii) (1988). A "qualified pre-1985 instrument" does not,
however, include any divorce decree or separation instrument that has been expressly
amended to disregard the statutory rules that existed prior to 1985. I.R.C.
§ 152(e)(4)(B)(iii) (1988).
144. I.R.C. § 152(e)(4)(A)(ii) (1988).
[Vol. 55
22
Montana Law Review, Vol. 55 [1994], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol55/iss2/3
TAX CONSEQUENCES
VIII. FILING STATUS
Divorce raises significant procedural questions with respect to
taxpayers' filing status. For example, taxpayers who are living
apart pending a divorce 45 may still file a joint return as long as
they are married on the last day of the tax year. 1 6 Additionally,
the Code allows a divorced taxpayer to file a joint return if the
taxpayer remarries before the last day of the tax year. 1 7 Thus, a
taxpayer's marriage status at the end of the tax year greatly affects
the amount of federal income tax the taxpayer has to pay. For ex-
ample, in 1993, a taxpayer with taxable income of $25,000 and
married filing jointly, rather than single, would save $377 in tax
liability while a taxpayer with $50,000 taxable income would save
$1,924.
Furthermore, the Code grants special relief to unmarried di-
vorced taxpayers. A divorced taxpayer may choose between single
or head of household filing status.4 8 Section 1(c) automatically
grants single status to all unmarried individuals. 49 However, a tax-
payer must meet specific requirements to qualify for head of
household status. °50 A taxpayer must:
(1) not be married at the close of the tax year;' 5'
(2) not be a surviving spouse;1 52
(3) maintain a household that constitutes the "principal place
of abode" for a child for more than one-half the tax year;153 and
(4) furnish over one-half the cost of maintaining the household
during the tax year. 54
145. See I.R.C. §§ 2(b)(2)(B), 7703(a) (1988), provided there is no decree that legally
separates the couple, such as a divorce decree or decree of separate maintenance. See also
Boyer v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. 143, 146-47 (1982) (ordering support and separation of the
parties; married filing joint return not allowed); Boettiger v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 477
(1958), acq., 1959-1 C.B. 3 (court-ordered support only; couple can still file joint return);
Johnson v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 868 (1980) (voluntary separation; the couple
can still file as married).
146. I.R.C. § 7703(a)(1) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.2-2(b)(5) (as amended in 1971). For
most taxpayers, December 31 is the last day of the tax year.
147. I.R.C. § 77 03(a)(1). See generally I.R.S. PUBLICATION 504, Divorced or Separated
Individuals 2-3 (1993).
148. In 1993, a taxpayer with $25,000 taxable income filing as head of household,
rather than single, would save $377 in taxes; a taxpayer with $50,000 of taxable income
qualifying as head of household would save $975. Head of household status taxes $7,500
more at the 15% rate, as opposed to 28% for single status. See I.R.C. § 1 (1988).
149. I.R.C. § 1(c) (1988).
150. I.R.C. § 2(b) (1988).
151. I.R.C. § 2(b)(1) (1988).
152. I.R.C. § 2(b)(1); see I.R.C. § 2(a) (1988) for qualifications of surviving spouse
status.
153. I.R.C. § 2(b)(1)(A) (1988).
154. I.R.C. § 2(b)(1).
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While the first two requirements are self-explanatory, the
third and fourth requirements are more complex.' 55 The third fac-
tor requires that the taxpayer and the child occupy the household
in order for the home to qualify as the principal place of abode.1 56
The Service treats the taxpayer's child as occupying the household
even if the child is temporarily absent.157 Examples of temporary
absences are "illness, education, " business, vacation, military ser-
vice, or a custody agreement under which a child or stepchild is
absent for less than six months in the taxable year."159
Under the fourth requirement, the taxpayer maintains a
household only if the taxpayer furnishes over half of the cost of
maintaining the household during the taxable year.' 60 The Service
considers the cost of maintaining a household to be any expense
incurred in the operation of the principal place of abode for the
mutual benefit of the occupants.16' The Code includes the follow-
ing as examples of expenses of maintaining a household: "property
taxes, mortgage interest, rent, utility charges, upkeep and repairs,
property insurance, and food consumed on the premises. ' '1 62
Although only one of the divorced spouses may qualify for
head of household status, both parties may still secure tax benefits
from raising a child.' 63 A taxpayer does not need to claim the child
as a dependent in order to qualify as head of household.' 6" There-
fore, a spouse who qualifies for head of household status may
transfer to the former spouse the right to a dependency exemp-
tion.'65 This election allows the divorced couple to split the tax
benefits of having a dependent child-one spouse receives the ex-
emption and the other spouse qualifies for head of household filing
155. Marriage is determined at one point in time, the last day of the tax
year-generally December 31. Surviving spouse designation is granted special filing status in
the year of the spouse's death and the following two years, provided, however, that the
surviving spouse maintains a household for a dependent and is not married at the end of the
year in which the surviving spouse status is claimed. I.R.C. § 2(a)(2)(A) (1988).
156. Treas. Reg. § 1.2-2(c) (as amended in 1971).
157. Treas. Reg. § 1.2-2(c).
158. See Blair v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 214 (1974), aff'd on other grounds, 538 F.2d
155 (7th Cir. 1976) (although child was away at school more than six months of the tax year,
the parent's home still qualified for the child's principal place of abode).
159. Treas. Reg. § 1.2-2(c).
160. I.R.C. § 2(b)(1)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.2-2(d) (as amended in 1971).
161. Treas. Reg. § 1.2-2(d).
162. Treas. Reg. § 1.2-2(d).
163. Splitting custody of two or more children will allow both taxpayers to qualify as
head of household. However, "[u]nder no circumstances shall the same child be used to
qualify more than one taxpayer as the head of a household for the same taxable year."
Treas. Reg. § 1.2-2(b)(2) (as amended in 1971).
164. I.R.C. § 2(b)(1)(A)(i) (1988).
165. I.R.C. § 2(b)(1)(A)(i).
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status.
Head of household filing status provides significant tax sav-
ings. This special status allows more income to be taxed at lower
rates.166 Additionally, the taxpayer receives a larger standard de-
duction when the taxpayer files as a head of household instead of
single. 67 The standard deduction is the amount the Service allows
a taxpayer to deduct from adjusted gross income if the taxpayer
chooses not to itemize deductions. '68 This Article discusses stan-
dard and itemized deductions in a subsequent section. 6 '
Usually, taxpayers make custody and child care arrangements
with little, if any, concern for the tax consequences. As a result, the
practitioner can provide little tax planning advice for a taxpayer
wishing to qualify as a head of household. Nevertheless, the practi-
tioner should advise clients of the head- of-household status and
its requirements. The practitioner should also keep in mind that a
couple appearing to be divorced will be able to file a joint return
unless a divorce decree or final decree of separate maintenance has
been issued.17 1
The practitioner can use tax planning to avoid one common
pitfall. A problem occurs when a taxpayer attempting to claim
head of household filing status receives both alimony and child
support payments. The taxpayer must provide over one-half the
expense of maintaining the child's home.17' If the payee spouse
uses child support payments for maintaining the household, the
taxpayer may not qualify for head of household filing status.
Therefore, he or she should pay expenses that do not qualify for
maintaining a household'7 1 out of child support payments.
IX. DEDUCTIBILITY OF LEGAL EXPENSES
The Service does not allow taxpayers to deduct expenses re-
lated to divorce, because a divorce is personal in nature.7  This
rule is consistent with the Code's general theme of not allowing
166. See supra note 148.
167. I.R.C. § 63(c)(2) (1988). In 1994, the standard deduction for single status is
$3,800, for head of household the standard deduction is $5,600, and married filing joint is
$6,350. See I.R.C. § 63(c)(2)(B), (C) (1988).
168. I.R.C. § 63(b) (1988).
169. See infra part IX.
170. See supra notes 145-46.
171. I.R.C. § 2(b)(1).
172. See Treas. Reg. § 1.2-2(d) (among items not included in maintaining the house-
hold are clothing, education, medical, meals away from home).
173. Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(a), (b)(7) (1986); United States v. Patrick, 372 U.S. 53
(1963); United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39 (1963).
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deductions for personal expenditures. 7 " However, the Code allows
limited deductions under special circumstances.
Generally, legal expenses incidental to a divorce or separation
are not deductible. 176 However, in certain limited contexts, a tax-
payer may deduct a portion of the legal fees associated with the
divorce or separation.17 6 If part of the legal fees are attributable to
the collection of alimony or income-producing property, that part
qualifies as a miscellaneous deduction. 17 7 Additionally, if part of a
taxpayer's legal fees are attributable to advice on tax matters inci-
dental to a divorce or separation, that part also qualifies as a mis-
cellaneous itemized deduction. 17 8 When the taxpayer receives legal
advice on tax matters as well as other matters, the taxpayer must
properly allocate and substantiate the expenses associated with the
tax advice.1 79
Practitioners should note that taxpayers making alimony pay-
ments (payor spouses) have an even greater limitation on the de-
duction of legal fees. 180 Legal fees incurred in defending non-pay-
ment of alimony or in attempting to reduce alimony payments are
not deductible. 18' Additionally, the payor spouse cannot deduct
payment of the payee spouse's legal fees.182
A taxpayer must itemize deductible legal expenses.183 These
expenses are considered miscellaneous itemized deductions and are
subject to a two percent floor. 18 Taxpayers calculate the two per-
cent floor by multiplying their adjusted gross income (AGI) for the
tax year by .02.186 Any amount of deductible legal fees greater than
the two percent floor is deductible as an itemized expense.8 6
As a practical matter, taxpayers seldom benefit from deduct-
ing legal expenses. Most taxpayers rarely incur miscellaneous de-
ductions, 87 including legal fees, that exceed the two percent bar-
174. I.R.C. § 262(a) (1988).
175. Tress. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(7) (as amended in 1972).
176. Tress. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(7).
177. I.R.C. § 212(1) (1988); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.67-1T(a)(1)(ii) (1988).
178. I.R.C. § 212(3) (1988); Temp. Tress. Reg. § 1.67-1T(a)(1)(iii) (1988).
179. Rev. Rul. 72-545, 1972-2 C.B. 179-80 (citing Fleischman v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.
439 (1966); McDonald v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 82 (1969)).
180. Tress. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(7) (as amended in 1972).
181. Sunderland v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 512, 513 (1977).
182. Martin v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 255, 261 (1979).
183. See Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(7); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.67-1T(a)(1)(ii).
184. I.R.C. § 67(a) (1988); Temp. Tress. Reg. § 1.67-1T(a)(1)(ii). Amounts less than
the two percent floor are non-deductible.
185. I.R.C. § 67(a); Temp. Tress. Reg. § 1.67-1T(a)(ii).
186. I.R.C. § 67(a); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.67-1T(a)(ii).
187. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.67-1T (1988) (examples are tax preparation fees, busi-
ness and investment expenses, union and professional dues, and unreimbursed employee
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rier. Moreover, even if the total miscellaneous itemized deductions
exceed the two percent floor, the taxpayer loses the amount up to
the two percent floor.1 88 For example, assume a taxpayer has ad-
justed gross income of $32,000, $750 in deductible legal expense,189
and $90 in other miscellaneous expenses. 9" The two percent floor
is computed by multiplying .02 by $32,000 which equals $640. The
total miscellaneous deductions are $840 ($750 $90). Therefore,
the deductible amount is $200 ($840 - $640), which is the amount
of miscellaneous deductions in excess of the two percent floor.1 '
Finally, total itemized deductions must exceed the standard de-
duction that applies to the taxpayer's filing status. In 1994, the
standard deduction for married filing joint taxpayers is $6,350, for
head of household is $5,560, and for single taxpayers is $3,800.192
Therefore, if a taxpayer's total itemized deductions do not exceed
the standard deduction, the taxpayer would not receive any benefit
by itemizing.'
As illustrated above, the Service has made full deductibility
impossible 9 4 and partial deductibility very difficult. In summary,
the taxpayer must overcome two major hurdles before receiving
any tax benefit for these expenses. First, the taxpayer must incur
miscellaneous deductions'9 " in one tax year that exceed two per-
cent of the taxpayer's AGI.' 96 Second, the taxpayer must incur to-
tal itemized deductions 9 7 greater than the standard deduction' "
allowed in that tax year.
Proper planning can reduce the effects of these provisions, but
cannot eliminate the partial loss of the deduction caused by the
two percent floor. The taxpayer should group and pay legal and
expenses).
188. See I.R.C. § 67(a).
189. See supra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.
190. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.67-1T.
191. I.R.C. § 67(a).
192. I.R.C. § 63(c) (1988); Rev. Proc. 93-49, 1993-42 I.R.B. 18.
193. Continuing the previous example, further assume that the single taxpayer has
$2,000 in mortgage interest, has $500 in property taxes and made $300 in deductible contri-
butions. Since the combined total of itemized deductions is only $3,000, it is more advanta-
geous for the taxpayer to use the $3,800 standard deduction available to single taxpayers.
Hence, under this scenario, the taxpayer receives no real deduction or benefit from paying
legal fees.
194. See I.R.C. § 67 (1988). The amount up to the two percent floor is lost.
195. I.R.C. § 67(b) (1988); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.67-1T(a) (1988). See generally I.R.S.
PUBLICATION 529, Miscellaneous Deductions (1993).
196. I.R.C. § 67(b); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.67-1T(a).
197. Reported on I.R.S. Form 1040, Schedule A.
198. I.R.C. § 63(c).
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other itemized deductible expenses in the same tax year."9 This
planning will help ensure that the deductions exceed both the two
percent floor and the standard deduction. Furthermore, if possible,
the taxpayer should postpone income to another year in order to
reduce AGI in the year that the taxpayer takes the deductions.
The reduction in AGI reduces the two percent floor, which allows
the taxpayer to use a larger amount of miscellaneous deductions.
Finally, the practitioner should allocate the billed fee between tax
and production of income advice and other legal advice concerning
the divorce.20 0 This allocation ensures proper substantiation of the
deduction.
X. CONCLUSION
The attorney who represents a party during divorce proceed-
ings should consider the tax implications of alimony and child sup-
port payments and divisions of property and payment of attorneys'
fees. A lack of tax planning may cause the client to experience un-
favorable tax consequences. Such consequences add to the frustra-
tions the client has already endured while undergoing a divorce.
Consequently, a basic understanding of the relevant tax laws is im-
perative when counseling a client during a dissolution of marriage.
Although this Article has not covered every conceivable tax
consideration, it has, nevertheless, attempted to familiarize the
general practitioner with the most important tax laws that apply to
a dissolution of marriage. A thorough review of these laws and
their application to the client's situation should eliminate
most adverse tax consequences to the client.
199. For example, if all the legal work will be completed in January of the following
year, the taxpayer may wish to accelerate payment of the legal fees in the current year.
200. Rev. Rul. 72-545, 1972-2 C.B. 179-80.
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